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the revolutionary armed 
forces of colombia
A Realistic and Imminent Danger 
to U.S. Security
Andrew D. Grabau
The United States is susceptible to a potential attack by 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a terrorist 
group known as FARC. Several guerilla tactics are viable 
for implementation military and civilian personnel in 
addition to clandestine operations. There is a 70 percent 
probability that FARC will soon engage in retaliatory, 
covert operations against key U.S. military installations 
in U.S. cities bordering the Gulf of Mexico.
The history of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia can be traced to an early 1960s guerilla 
group of rebel peasants that was established as its 
transliterated acronym “FARC” in 1964. Through the 
1980s, this terrorist group accumulated a large portion 
of its revenue from kidnapping and extortion.  Many of 
the U.S. anti-drug policies of the 1990s inadvertently 
aided FARC and enabled the organization to increase 
its territory within Colombia.105  FARC has engaged in 
multiple deadly firefights with the Colombian military 
and the DEA since the 1990s. In fiscal year 1999, the 
United States expanded its assistance to Colombia 
to $317 million, and later to almost $1 billion in 
2000.106 President Andres Pastrana attempted to 
negotiate a peaceful resolution with FARC in 1999, 
but was unsuccessful in the endeavor.  During that 
year, the rebel organization was able to capture a third 
of the country’s territory.  By 2002, the massive rebel 
war machine and drug trafficking empire reached 
its peak.107  
The United States, as an ally of the Colombian 
military, has caused significant setbacks to FARC’s 
105  Peceny, Mark and Michael Durnan, “The FARC’s Best 
Friend U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colom-
bia’s Civil War in the 1990s,” Latin American Politics Soci-
ety vol. 48, no.2. July 2006.  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2006.tb00348.x/abstract (accessed 17 
March 2012), 97.
106 Ibid, 110.
107 McDermott, Jeremy. “Colombia’s FARC Rebels: End to Kidnap 
a New Start?”. BBC News. 27 February 2012. http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17177643?print=true, (accessed 
17 March 2012).
strategic objectives since 2001; however, U.S. 
involvement did not immediately deter the terrorist 
group’s financing methods. In 2002 alone, the 
guerillas were responsible for almost all of Colombia’s 
2,882 kidnappings, which amassed millions of dollars 
in ransom.108 The group also held three Americans 
captive for four years, releasing them in 2006; this 
demonstrates their willingness to kidnap American 
personnel.109  For years, the United States has been 
funding and training the AUC, or the United Self-
Defense Groups of Colombia, to fight against FARC 
forces. In addition, the U.S. has allocated massive 
financial support to the Colombian government for 
the sole purpose of destroying the terrorist faction. 
Since the beginning, FARC’s leadership structure 
has consisted of a seven-man council.  In 2008, the 
Colombian military launched a massive raid with the 
support of U.S. intelligence against a FARC camp 
located across the border in Ecuador. The raid resulted in 
the deaths of key leaders Raul Reyes and Ivan Rios, with 
the eventual elimination of top commander Manuel 
Marulanda two years later. The dismantling of leadership, 
in conjunction with captured intelligence, struck a 
massive blow to FARC and its capabilities.  Intelligence 
recovered in the raid indicated that Ecuadorian president 
Rafael Correa, along with Venezuela, had been rendering 
financial support to FARC and providing a safe haven 
in Ecuador.110 A Colombian bombing raid dispatched 
FARC commander Mono Jojoy in September of 2010, 
while a similar raid the following year resulted in the 
death of FARC’s chief leader and commander, Alfonso 
Cano. The President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, 
called it the “most devastating blow to the group in 
its decades-long insurgency.”111 Now that five of the 
original seven council commanders have been killed, 
FARC’s strength has decreased and its operational ability 
has been limited.
 
108 Ibid, 2.
109 Sullivan, Mark. Latin America: Terrorism Issues. (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008). http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf,  (accessed 14 March 2012), 2.
110 Beittel, June. Colombia: Issues for Congress. (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011). http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf, (accessed 14 March 2012), 10.
111 McDermott, Jeremy. “Top FARC Rebel Leader Alfonso Cano 
Killed in Colombia,” BBC News. 05 November 2011. http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-15604456, (accessed 28 March 2012).
countries are compelled to spend millions of dollars 
each day to pay off debt with money that could be 
used for economic reform, education, healthcare, 
or a multitude of other beneficial areas. In fact, 
government spending on education and improving 
the health of its citizens has declined due to an increase 
in debt. This downward spiral has led to higher death 
rates, particularly among children. An estimated 
21,000 children die each day from poverty-related 
causes, according to UNICEF’s Progress of Nations 
2000 report.100  This figure implies the statistic of one 
child’s death every four seconds, which amounts to 
fourteen children each minute.101 In addition to poor 
healthcare, low-income countries have suffered from 
weak economic performance, which has resulted in a 
decrease in economic reforms. 
Despite these seemingly high statistics, there are 
numerous organizations whose sole focus is to end, or 
lessen, third world debt. These groups include Jubilee 
2000 UK / Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC), Christian-
Aid, Oxfam UK, World Development Movement, 
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development 
(CAFOD), and Tearfund. Of these organizations, 
JDC is the most significant in that it is highly involved 
in aiding third world countries. Their mission is to 
bring “an end to all unpayable poor country debts by 
fair and transparent means.”102 JDC hopes to amend 
government policy on debt in order to cancel all third 
world debt. They argue that the accumulation of 
debt by third world countries was unjust and is only 
making their economies worse.  
Third world debt plays a critical role in how 
countries govern themselves. Countries that are unable 
to maintain a stable government and economy, such 
as Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen, are often dominated 
by stronger ones; therefore, the welfare of third world 
economies is at risk of being controlled by terrorists 
groups.  In a speech to the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Princeton N. Lyman explained that in east 
Africa, “some [immediate threats] arise from failed or 
 
100 Shah, Anup. “Debt and the Effect on Children,” Global Issues. 04 July 
2000. http://www.globalissues.org/article/33/debt-and-the-effect-on-
children, (accessed 13 March 2012).
101 Ibid. 
102 Jubilee Debt Campaign UK, “Our Mission”.  http://www.jubileedebtcam-
paign.org.uk/Our3720mission+2245.twl, (accessed 13 March 2012).  
failing states that allow financial exploitation by 
terrorist groups or exploitation of internal conflicts 
to recruit members to terrorist networks.”103  Terrorist 
groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabab have already 
demonstrated this by infiltrating numerous regions 
throughout Africa and seizing control of various aspects 
of society as a result of weak governmental security. 
In order for third world countries to become more 
robust against infiltrations by terrorists groups, as well as 
reduce or even put an end to the debt crisis, governments 
and bank sectors should put a greater emphasis on 
analyzing their current financial situations. While 
numerous online resources such as PovcalNet, have 
been created to allow the public the ability to assess the 
current poverty calculations, this should not be viewed 
as the sole solution for such a wide-scale problem.104 
The Jubilee Debt Campaign suggests that a complete 
cancellation of all debt would be the ideal solution; 
however, this is unrealistic.  Instead, debt should be 
analyzed as to what is payable versus unpayable, while 
having grants issued as opposed to additional loans, 
which frequently result in an exponential growth of 
debt. If such changes are implemented in resolving the 
debt crisis, third world countries would have a better 
opportunity to become stable as well as more secure 
against terrorist organizations.  
The effects of debt on third world countries 
are alarming and will likely continue to increase. 
The deficit is affecting all aspects of society and 
has impacted relations between the rich and poor 
countries. Various campaign groups are working to 
desperately amend government policy on debt by 
analyzing the two types of debt, the possibility of 
issuing grants rather than loans, and making society 
more aware of the severity of this crisis, which are 
crucial first steps in empowering the third world to 
develop a better environment for its citizenry, and a 
worse one for subversive organizations. 
103 Lyman, Princeton, N. The Terrorist Threat in Africa, Council on Foreign 
Relations. http://www.cfr.org/africa/terrorist-threat-africa/p6912, (ac-
cessed 14 March 2012). 
104 ”PovcalNet: An Online Poverty Analysis Tool,” The World Bank. http://
iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm, (accessed 01 July 2012. 
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group in the Spanish Basque region.119 If the Cuban 
government decides to provide even a temporary 
safe haven for FARC, the group could use Cuba as 
a launching point for a retaliatory strike on select 
American targets in the Gulf of Mexico. Lastly, the 
Colombian terrorist group has become more lethal in 
the past six years in the areas of advanced terrorism and 
explosives; this is likely because the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) had dispatched personnel to Colombia 
to provide advanced terrorist tactics training and 
bomb-making expertise.
Throughout its history of violence and rebellion, 
FARC has consistently utilized one effective method to 
accumulate more military power. This method would 
certainly be plausible if FARC decides to engage in 
covert strikes on the Gulf Coast against Americans 
and military targets. Stratfor labels it the “Carrot-and-
Stick Strategy.”120 The Colombian government has 
been insistent about establishing peace negotiations 
with the revolutionary group for decades, though 
FARC has traditionally used dialogue to build up its 
military strength. An example of this is the ambush 
in March 2012 that killed 11 Colombian soldiers 
which was conducted on the same day that FARC 
announced it was ready to release hostages.121  The 
faction will routinely increase the tenacity of offensive 
strikes on key investments in Colombia, such as 
destroying the CamonLimon-Covenas pipeline in 
2012, or kidnapping high-profile citizens until the 
Colombian government returns to the negotiation 
table.122 
This tactic would certainly be implemented if 
FARC engaged in kidnapping U.S. citizens along 
the Gulf Coast, in addition to bombing targeted 
infrastructure.  FARC would sporadically increase 
its amount of kidnappings while dangling the carrot 
of hostage releases until the U.S. extends its hand of 
 
119 Ibid, 5.
120 Stratfor Analysis, “Colombia: The Farc’s Carrot-and-Stick Strat-
egy,” Stratfor. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/colombia-farcs-
carrot-and-stick-strategy, (accessed 01 April 2012).
121 Kouri, Jim. “FARC Terrorists Kill Colombian Soldiers, Threaten 
US Police Advisors”.
122 Stratfor Analysis. “Colombia: The Farc’s Carrot-and-Stick Strat-
egy”. Stratfor. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/colombia-farcs-
carrot-and-stick-strategy, (accessed 1 April 2012).
diplomacy. The organization would then demand 
that the U.S. end financial and tactical support to 
the Colombian military, in addition to requiring the 
extraction of U.S. personnel from Bogota.  Realistically 
however, FARC would only end its operations if it 
felt that it had drained a satisfying amount of leverage 
of America’s political leverage and strength from 
the region. 
In studying FARC’s capabilities and attack 
strategies, the following is a projection of most likely 
scenarios. The U.S. Army Southern Command, 
known as USSOUTHCOM, should be prepared 
for the possibility of a retaliatory FARC operation 
against U.S. military and civilian assets, both within 
Colombian and United States boundaries. The first 
projected strategy is a possible “nightmare” scenario. 
One such potential series of developments is 
this: FARC could conceal several small covert ops 
teams in cargo ships leaving Havana bound for Gulf 
cities like New Orleans, Miami, and Texas. Due to 
known weaknesses in U.S. port security, FARC could 
successfully gain illegal entrance.  Upon gaining a 
foothold, FARC could target drilling rigs, oil fields in 
Texas and New Orleans, or oil platforms in the Gulf 
of Mexico. Three small teams, with advanced training 
by the IRA, could target at least three separate sites 
and devastate the American economy in a matter of 
days. A second permutation of a nightmare scenario 
could involve the targeting of U.S. narcotics agents 
in Colombia; FARC could use the same strategy and 
methods to deliver a blow to USSOUTHCOM in 
Miami, the Joint Interagency Task Force-South in 
Key West, or US Army South at Fort Sam Houston 
in Texas, although this would be a significantly more 
difficult operation. 
In either scenario, direct covert operations 
against the United States would certainly provoke 
retaliation upon FARC, or would at least commence 
a withdrawal from Colombia through diplomacy. The 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the longest 
running terrorist organization, will not soon forget 
America’s intervention in their affairs in Colombia. 
Therefore, we must now anticipate FARC’s long-
awaited revenge in the form of direct attack upon 
the United States.  With this potential threat on the 
horizon, America must remain vigilant as it stands 
against the threat of terrorist organizations.
Junior level leaders in FARC have been extradited 
to the United States to face drug trafficking charges, 
which gives FARC another reason to retaliate. An 
organization that has endured 48 years, the longest of 
any terrorist group, is certainly capable of recovering 
from these strategic blows.  In doing so, FARC will 
remember its enemies: Colombia and the United 
States. While FARC’s hope of a dominant takeover 
in Colombia is most likely futile, it is predictable that 
they will commence a retaliatory strike against U.S. 
citizens or military targets. 
In comprehending FARC’s threat to U.S. security, 
the group’s military capability and recurring strategic 
themes must be analyzed. FARC’s troop strength has 
significantly dropped to an estimated 8,000 fighters, 
a mere half their number in 2002.112 After having 
much of its communications systems infiltrated and 
the majority of its leadership eliminated, an external 
view would suggest that FARC is crippled indefinitely. 
Yet this may not be the case; FARC had the audacity 
to execute four hostages in 2011. The guerrillas’ 
financial supply still continues to flow in millions of 
dollars every year. In 2008, it was estimated that the 
organization made almost $500 million annually.113 
By 2012, FARC has likely lost close to $200 million 
to each year’s revenues because of military defeats. 
Colombia’s terrorist group has advanced its 
weaponry throughout the years. Upgraded landmines, 
assault rifles, RPGs, and tactical gear have made FARC 
more lethal. The group seemingly used improvised 
explosive mines against Colombian soldiers, which 
demonstrates their advanced weapons training.114 A 
disturbing government report on March 26, 2008 
claimed that Colombian officials had “recovered 66 
pounds of depleted uranium that had been acquired 
by FARC.”115 One Colombian police report in 2008 
 
112 McDermott, “Colombia’s FARC Rebels: End to Kidnap a New 
Start?”, 1.
113 Pherson, Randolph H. and Sarah Beebe. Cases in Intelligence 
Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action. (Thousand 
Oaks, California: CQ Press, 2012), 159.
114 Kouri, Jim. “FARC Terrorists Kill Colombian Soldiers, Threaten 
US Police Advisors”. Canadian Free Press. 21 March 2012. 
http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/45395 (ac-
cessed 2 April 2012).
115 Walser, Ray. “The FARC files, Colombia, and International Ter-
rorism”. The Heritage Foundation. 28 March 2008. http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/the-farc-files-colombia-
and-international-terrorism, (accessed 28 March 2012).
stated that Venezuela had sent $300 million to the 
group’s leadership, and that FARC was “seeking 
uranium on the black market and had plans for 
a radioactive ‘dirty bomb.’”116 This confirms the 
findings of the 2008 raid, which displays FARC’s 
serious pursuit of dirty bombs that could be used 
against the United States for retribution.  
A second aspect of FARC’s military capability 
is its recent buildup of allied support. Key alliances 
with nation states and terrorist cells in South 
America have strengthened FARC both internally 
and externally. The captured computer files found 
in 2008 strongly indicate that FARC has extensive 
negotiations, cooperation, and possible support 
from the government of Ecuador as well as a strong 
relationship with President Chavez of Venezuela, 
which dates back to 1992. Chavez’s support includes 
current political patronage, secret financial funding, 
and possible military aid.117 A 2010 State Department 
report affirmed that Chavez’s government has not 
been proactive in arresting Venezuelan government 
and military officials linked to FARC; meanwhile, 
U.S. officials testified in October of 2011 that FARC 
is still procuring shelter locations across the border in 
Venezuela.118 
Two additional components of this relationship 
must be observed. The first is that Venezuela, for 
all intents and purposes, is a sworn enemy of the 
United States. Venezuelan refineries are irreplaceable 
to U.S. oil, and Chavez may use this as a playing 
card to support a FARC operation against America. 
Secondly, Venezuela is known for to accommodate 
Iranian intelligence agents and Hezbollah recruits. 
The cooperation between South American countries 
and anti-American Middle Eastern groups lends truth 
to the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” 
The government of Ecuador has provided a safe 
haven for FARC for many years, but recently seems 
to have begun withdrawing support. Cuba has also 
maintained strong yet discreet relations with FARC in 
addition to the ETA, a strong terrorist and liberation 
116 Windrem, Robert. “Colombian Conflict Poses Growing Threat 
to U.S.”. MSNBC. March 5, 2008. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/23490329/ns/nightly_news/t/colombian-conflict-poses-grow-
ing-threat-us/, (accessed 28 March 2012).
117 Ibid, 2.
118 Sullivan, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, 7.
